Arms Control & Non Proliferation
Documents & Texts from America.gov
22 July 2008
Arms Control Verification Requires Experts with Special Skills
By Jacquelyn S. Porth
Staff Writer
Washington -- The media often trumpet the dispatch of arms control experts to a country of concern. But what these experts do often remains largely invisible.
Verification experts were sent into Iraq, for example, to search for dangers. In June 2008, U.S. and Iraqi experts sent to Canada the last bit of concentrated natural uranium accumulated during Saddam Hussein’s reign at the country’s main nuclear complex in Tuwaitha.
Now it never will be used for nuclear weapons or transferred to terrorists who might use it for an improvised explosive device to scatter debris and sow panic.
This is not the first time since 2004 that the United States helped remove Iraqi radioactive material.
The removal of the 550 metric tons of Iraqi yellowcake also eliminated a health hazard. If improperly stored, its dust can be inhaled or leach into drinking water and damage internal organs.
But what skills do verification experts need to promote confidence that the deed is done? Certainly he/she must have good analytical skills, be curious and possess a healthy dose of skepticism. A verifier and detective have similar goals: both are looking for clues, while evaluating motive and intent.
Sometimes verifiers function as accountants plowing through vast troves of documents searching for anomalies or omissions. North Korea, for example, turned over 18,000 pages of documentation in May to a U.S. government delegation as part of the Six-Party Talks, and verification experts continue to pore over them. (See "North Korea Nuclear Declaration Step in Right Direction, Says Bush.")
Verifiers must be patient while painstakingly examining suspect facilities and scrutinizing reams of photo imagery gathered at suspicious sites.
Records must be examined meticulously and log books searched for alterations. Personnel who work with nuclear, chemical or biological agents must be interviewed at length to determine whether they answer questions consistently and plausibly.
During interviews of scientists and production workers who handle dangerous materials, verifiers try to spot implausible explanations. They look for attempts by technicians or laborers to be evasive and then push hard for more accurate information and data.
These experts must be adept at handling specialized gear such as radiation monitors, ground-penetrating radar and air-sampling equipment. They also must be ready to scramble into dirty and possibly contaminated areas to do whatever is necessary, even wearing protective gear to inspect empty furnace pits and examine exhaust ducts or water pipes.
Verifiers are forensics experts, too, classifying dust particles, fibers, machine parts and even fingerprints.
VERIFICATION INVOLVES TECHNICAL, LEGAL, POLICY ISSUES
The verification process requires a judgment on whether a country is complying with its arms control obligations.
Attitudes toward arms control verification have evolved. Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter says there was a time when it was assumed that parties would not sign an arms control agreement with the intention of violating it. Verifiers may have had to deal with occasions of unintentional violations occurring. But now their job requires greater vigilance as some countries seek willfully to hide treaty violations.
DeSutter heads the State Department’s Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation and recently was interviewed by America.gov. Verification is much more than a technical process, she said. Technical data must be interpreted, the assistant secretary said; "you have to determine what it means."
Verification requires experts to look at what a country has done and compare it to political commitments. Difficulties may not necessarily arise from lack of data, she said, but because the obligation that a country has made is not always crystal clear.
Weapons activities must be "measured against commitments that are comprised of words," DeSutter said, "and words can always have different meanings to people."
If something cannot be verified "we have to say: it’s not verifiable," DeSutter said, "or it’s not effectively verifiable" because there is "a low degree of verifiability." Perfect verification does not exist, she said, because "one can’t know everything."
Behind the scenes, general policy debate often revolves around the issue of intent. If disagreement occurs in the U.S. interagency deliberation process, DeSutter said, the ultimate decision resides with the president.
Verification encompasses "technical, legal and policy issues," she said. The legal standard of verification generally entails being able "to detect significant noncompliance in enough time to undertake response options," the official said, either to offset the negative consequence of a violation or to persuade a country to return to compliance.
DeSutter said the verification process has been difficult for those who must analyze, verify and advise policymakers about the nature of weapons programs pursued by Iran and North Korea.
The United States has had nuclear and health safety experts in North Korea at the Yongbyon facilities since November 2007 overseeing disablement activities.
A future verification team, now being negotiated, will have a long road ahead as it seeks to ensure that North Korea hides neither nuclear materials nor production facilities. (See "Six-Party Talks Shift to Confirming North Korean Nuclear Claims.")
In terms of size, DeSutter said that a team should not be so large as to be misconstrued as an invasion of technical experts, but it should draw on the expertise of other countries with a stake in promoting a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
"I am hoping that the Russians play an active role," DeSutter said, "because we and the Russians, together, have more experience conducting on-site inspections -- including on each other -- than any other nations in the world." She said the Russians would contribute a considerable amount of "professionalism and expertise to the inspection process."
For more information, see various editions of the State Department’s compliance reports from the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.
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